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Introduction: Why Law Matters
The Balfour Declaration had enormous political significance, but did it have any 
legal force? Was it legally binding, exposing Britain to legal remedies for its breach, 
or was it merely an expression of policy that could be disregarded without legal 
consequences? These questions are of intense interest to legal historians, but they 
also have contemporary political relevance. The issue is not so much whether Britain 
might be liable to the Palestinians for failing to safeguard the “civil and religious 
rights” of non-Jewish residents of Palestine, though that is a theoretical possibility. 
Instead, the question is whether the Declaration is legally relevant to the ongoing 
peace process. The Declaration’s binding character matters because any negotiated 
settlement to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will take the form of a legal document, 
and any such document will build on—indeed, be shaped by—the pre-existing legal 
framework. If the Balfour Declaration is part of that legal framework, then a final 
settlement to the conflict has to account for the legal obligations set forth in the 
Declaration, at least in broad terms. The parties have routinely recited the most 
prominent planks of the legal framework in their peace agreements. The Camp 
David Accords and the first Oslo Accord, for example, both begin by invoking UN 
Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.1
The legal framework is important in another way: it shapes the negotiation 
process itself. Background legal norms set boundaries for the parties by describing 
which negotiating positions are acceptable and which are beyond the pale. What is 
more, the legal framework can define the political “center of gravity” of negotiations. 
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If, for example, there is unquestionably a “Palestinian right of return,” then the 
Palestinian negotiating position on displaced persons is somewhat stronger; if, on the 
other hand, there is no such right, then the Palestinian position is correspondingly 
weaker. If the Declaration has some binding character, in theory it could even be 
the basis for a lawsuit for reparations or other relief, although this is very unlikely. 
Finally, the legal framework provides a common language for negotiation, a shared 
vocabulary. This is no small thing when the parties come to the table without a 
shared historical narrative.
Accordingly, this paper takes up several questions about the legal history of 
the Balfour Declaration: Was the Declaration binding as a matter of international 
law when it was first issued in 1917? For that matter, was it binding in British 
domestic law? If not, did the Declaration acquire a legally-binding character once 
it was enshrined in the Mandate for Palestine? Did the purported termination of 
the Mandate also terminate the Declaration as a matter of law? Does the Balfour 
Declaration have any continuing legal effect today? Have modern legal norms of 
self-determination and anticolonialism destroyed any remnant of the Declaration 
that might have survived termination of the Mandate? Is it possible that some parts 
of it have no continuing validity, but others live on? 
The Legal Character of the Balfour Declaration, 1917–1923
The main body of the Balfour Declaration reads as follows:
His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a 
national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate 
the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done 
which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities 
in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.2
This instrument, embodied in a letter to Lord Rothschild, was not a treaty. Treaty 
law, then and now, generally requires an agreement between states.3 The Balfour 
Declaration did not purport to be an “agreement”; it is a letter to a private citizen 
containing a unilateral statement of policy. It was more a proclamation than an 
agreement. It became known as the Balfour Declaration, not the Balfour-Rothschild 
Agreement or the Britain-Zionist Treaty. 
Even if the Declaration could be understood as an agreement, neither Lord 
Rothschild nor the British Zionist Organization constituted a “state.” In international 
law a state, then and now, consists of an entity with a defined territory, a permanent 
population, a government, and the capacity to engage in foreign relations.4 Certainly, 
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the international community has sometimes taken a broad view of statehood. 
During World War I members of the British government seem to have assumed that 
the Hussein-McMahon correspondence constituted a “strict, contractual, treaty-like 
obligation.”5 (Indeed, there is a case to be made that the Hussein-McMahon letters 
have more of a legally binding character than the Balfour Declaration.) And treaty 
law has come to recognize treaties between a state and a “subject of international law” 
such as the Holy See or a national liberation movement that has some characteristics 
of statehood. I have argued elsewhere that the Oslo Accords are legally binding treaties 
between a state (Israel) and a “subject of international law,” the Palestine Liberation 
Organization.6 It is true, moreover, that the Zionists lobbied the British government, 
providing draft language, some of which (like the famous phrase “national home”) 
made it into the final document.7 But the Zionist Organization did not hold itself 
out as a state, and Lord Balfour did not purport to be making an agreement with one. 
In fact the words of the Declaration do not necessarily promise a full-fledged state. 
The curious term “national home,” which has no particular meaning in international 
law, could presumably have implied something less than a state—a territorial enclave 
inside another state, say, without the capacity to engage in foreign relations on its 
own. At any rate, it seems safe to conclude that the Balfour Declaration was not an 
“agreement between states” as is required of a treaty.  
There is a somewhat stronger argument that the Declaration was binding as 
a unilateral promise by a state made in good faith. Sixteen years after the Balfour 
Declaration, the Permanent Court of International Justice (the “World Court”) held 
that Norway was legally bound by a unilateral oral promise its foreign minister made 
regarding Eastern Greenland. The promise was not encased in a treaty, but the Court 
found it binding anyway, stressing that Denmark had relied on the promise.8 In 1974 
the PCIJ’s successor, the International Court of Justice, extended the holding in 
Eastern Greenland by concluding that a unilateral promise by France not to engage in 
certain nuclear tests was binding even without a showing of reliance by other states. 
The test for the 1974 Court was whether France’s promise had been made in “good 
faith” with intention to be bound.9 But the 1933 Eastern Greenland decision was 
something of a novelty; it is far from clear that it reflects the customary international 
law prevailing in 1917. Even today, examples of state practice or case law following 
Eastern Greenland and Nuclear Tests are rare. Still, the Balfour Declaration has some 
of the formal characteristics of those later, binding unilateral promises: it was issued 
by a senior government official, in written form, with a certain amount of formality, 
possibly reflecting intention to be bound.
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One obvious objection to this “unilateral obligation” theory is timing: Eastern 
Greenland postdates the Balfour Declaration. Normally we assess the legal validity 
of an act in light of then-prevailing law, not later law.10 One might circumvent 
this obstacle by arguing that Britain effectively reiterated the Declaration in the 
1930s, after Eastern Greenland was issued by the ICJ. But Britain did not restate the 
Declaration forcefully in that period; if anything, it sought to walk the Declaration 
back, as it moved to endorse the partition of Palestine. Alternatively, one might argue 
that Eastern Greenland’s “binding unilateral promise” theory was already becoming 
the law when the Balfour Declaration was issued in 1917. One might even argue 
that a “general principle” of contract law was evolving toward enforcement of some 
unilateral promises, particularly those inducing reliance, and that the common law 
was in the forefront of this development.11 But even if one concedes that Balfour’s 
declaration was made in good faith and that it induced reliance (in the form of 
Jewish immigration to Palestine, say), one might doubt whether the Declaration was 
made with “intention to be legally bound.”12 
In particular, one might doubt whether the Declaration embodies any promise 
at all. The Eastern Greenland/Nuclear Tests theory of unilateral obligation—and, as 
we shall see in a moment, domestic contract law—assumes there was a promise. In 
law a promise is understood as a “commitment,” not merely a statement of intention. 
Lord Balfour’s words arguably fall short of a commitment. He says the government 
“views with favour” the establishment of a national home in Palestine—not that 
he “promises” one. A promise does not require the use of the word “promise,” and 
indeed Balfour goes on to use one of the most common substitutes: the word “will.” 
The government “will use their best endeavours to facilitate this object.” Even so, 
the word “will” is qualified with “best endeavours” and “facilitate.” And, as Brian 
Klug has pointed out, the Declaration is encapsulated by a cover memorandum that 
further dilutes its character as a commitment. Lord Balfour says he is conveying a 
“declaration of sympathy.” That is not the language of promise.
To top it off, Lord Balfour’s much-qualified declaration is followed by a proviso 
that threatens to swallow up the supposed promise: “it being clearly understood that 
nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing 
non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed 
by Jews in any other country.” If the undertaking to facilitate a “national home” 
could only be fulfilled by prejudicing the “civil and religious rights” of non-Jewish 
communities in Palestine, then it was no promise at all. In law we might call such 
an undertaking an “illusory promise”—a promise that has the superficial attributes 
of a promise (the word “will”) but in substance lacks the requisite commitment of a 
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promise. At the time of Lord Balfour’s promise, illusory promises generally were not 
binding in British or American law.
Coincidentally, just one month after the Balfour Declaration was made public, a 
leading American court declared for the first time that a seemingly illusory promise 
could be rendered nonillusory (and hence binding) by assuming it included an 
obligation to use “best efforts” to achieve its aim. A “best efforts” (or “best endeavours”) 
clause, in other words, can “cure” an otherwise illusory promise. The decision, Wood v. 
Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, is one of the most famous in all of American contract law, 
and it was rendered by one of its most famous judges—Judge Benjamin Nathan 
Cardozo, of the New York Court of Appeals, himself a rather lukewarm Zionist. In 
Lucy a fashion designer had agreed to pay a promoter half the proceeds of whatever 
sales he made of her designs—but the contract contained no explicit promise that 
the promoter try to make any sales at all, and in fact he had not made any. Judge 
Cardozo found that the promoter had an “implied” (that is, unstated) duty to use 
“best efforts” to put the designs on sale. (As an aside, it is tempting to ask whether 
Cardozo had read the Balfour Declaration when he wrote his famous opinion in 
Lucy, Lady-Duff Gordon, and if so, whether it influenced his thinking. A review of 
the docket in Lucy sheds no light on this question.)
The Balfour Declaration contains just such a “best efforts” clause—the British 
version, a “best endeavours” clause. The Declaration says that the government will 
use its “best endeavours” to facilitate the object of a national home. British courts and 
contract drafters had long used such a clause to strengthen or clarify an underlying 
duty. One interesting question is whether any member of the British cabinet was 
familiar with this body of English law. Few members of the cabinet were lawyers, 
apart from David Lloyd George. Indeed, the 1917 British government seems to 
have drafted the Balfour Declaration without much lawyerly input. Thus it seems 
unlikely that the insertion of the “best endeavours” clause was designed to give the 
Declaration legal effect. 
There is at best a weak case, then, that the Declaration was binding in international 
law as a unilateral statement. Even if it had such a character, it still might have been 
unenforceable for other reasons. It might be said to have been inconsistent with 
Britain’s undertakings in the Hussein-McMahon correspondence, which had a more 
treaty-like nature than the Balfour Declaration. The binding nature and breadth 
of the Hussein-McMahon correspondence is beyond the scope of this paper, but 
it is fair to say that there is significant tension between the correspondence and 
the Declaration. One might also argue that even if the Balfour Declaration had 
some binding character as a matter of treaty law, it was unenforceable because it 
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violated an emerging international legal norm of self-determination, as embodied 
in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The problem with that contention is 
that the League of Nations itself endorsed the Declaration, more or less, when it 
incorporated much of its text into the Mandate for Palestine. The next section takes 
up that question in more detail.
Whether or not the Declaration had binding force in international law, it almost 
certainly had no binding effect in British domestic law. There was no general rule 
of British constitutional or administrative law that automatically ascribed binding 
status to unilateral statements of policy made by cabinet ministers. Then, as now, 
British public law was characterized by parliamentary supremacy. Parliament made 
law; the government executed law. Of course the prime minister and the Foreign 
Office conducted foreign policy, but it was policy, not law—changeable at will, not 
enforceable in courts.
Nor was the Declaration a contract under British domestic law. Even if one 
makes the precarious assumption that private contract law can apply to statements 
of policy by government ministers, the Balfour Declaration lacks the elements of 
a contract.13 British common law, then and now, generally defined a contract as a 
promise given in exchange for “consideration” (a return promise or performance), 
expressed through offer and acceptance or some other process indicating intent to 
be bound. Lord Balfour’s promise (if it was a promise) is not given in exchange for 
any explicit “consideration” on the part of Lord Rothschild or the Zionists. Even 
if the British harbored fantasies that the Zionists would somehow reciprocate by 
helping them in the war effort, those hopes were not expressed in any agreement, as 
is required of consideration doctrine.14 
In sum, there is a somewhat plausible argument that the Balfour Declaration 
was legally binding as a matter of international law between 1917 and 1923. It was 
not a treaty, but it might be regarded as a unilateral promise by a state, made in 
good faith and intended to be legally binding—depending on whether one finds a 
concrete promise in the document. If there is a continuum of legal obligation, one 
running from full obligation to soft obligation to zero obligation, then the Balfour 
Declaration might be somewhere in the soft middle. Even if it had some binding 
character, it was in tension with British undertakings in the Hussein-McMahon 
correspondence, which has a more treaty-like nature than the Balfour Declaration. 
Finally, whether or not the Balfour Declaration was binding in international law, it 
had little if any binding force in British domestic law. 
Did the Declaration become binding once it was embedded in the Mandate? 
The next section takes up that question.
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The Legal Character of the Declaration during the Mandate, 1923–1948
In its preamble, the Mandate for Palestine recites that the Allied Powers had agreed 
that Britain “should be responsible for putting into effect” the Balfour Declaration. 
This language alone might not connote legal obligation: “should” is traditionally 
regarded as the hortatory version of “shall.” But in Article 2, the Mandate imposes 
legal obligations on Britain. It declares that Britain “shall be responsible for placing 
the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will 
secure” the objectives of the Declaration, including establishment of the Jewish 
national home, creation of self-governing institutions, and safeguarding the rights of 
“all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.”15 
That said, the Mandate did not incorporate the Declaration verbatim. For 
example the Mandate replaced “view with favour” with “shall be responsible,” language 
more clearly indicating legal obligation. The Mandate also elaborated considerably 
on Britain’s obligations to Jews and non-Jews alike. Article 4, for example, calls for 
a Jewish Agency for Palestine, and Article 6 calls on Britain to “facilitate Jewish 
immigration” and to encourage “close settlement by Jews on the land.” Article 9 
protects the “rights” of “natives” and the “religious interests” of all peoples, and Article 
13 seeks to safeguard Muslim places of worship and other holy places.
In a sense, then, it is a category error to ask whether the Mandate transformed 
the Balfour Declaration into a legally-binding document, because the Mandate did 
not incorporate the Declaration word-for-word. Rather, the Mandate was a treaty-like 
instrument unto itself, as it was founded on a series of agreements, including the 
League Covenant, the San Remo Conference, the Treaty of Sèvres, and the actions of 
the League Council confirming the Mandate. There is little doubt that the Mandate 
had a binding character. The main legal question here is whether the Mandate 
violated higher norms of international law, in particular the emerging right of 
self-determination of peoples.
Under modern international law, a treaty-like instrument such as the Mandate 
is invalid if it violates peremptory norms of international law.16 In today’s law these 
norms are thought of as a sort of super-constitutional law of the international order, 
founded on natural law. These peremptory norms are known as jus cogens. While 
there is no agreement on the exact content of jus cogens, there is broad agreement 
that states cannot enter into treaties to commit genocide, torture, slavery, crimes 
against humanity, and other gross violations of human rights, and probably piracy 
and other serious international crimes. Some sources specifically identify the right of 
self-determination as a jus cogens norm.17
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Do these modern notions of jus cogens imply that, at the time of their promulgation, 
the Mandate and the Balfour Declaration were null and void as violating Arab rights 
of self-determination? The doctrine of intertemporal law dictates that we evaluate a 
legal instrument in light of the law prevailing at the time of its adoption, not in light 
of modern law.18 In 1923 the doctrine of jus cogens was not nearly as well embedded 
in international law as it is today. To be sure, the notion of natural law is as old as 
law itself: it features in sources as diverse as Sophocles’s Antigone, Thomas Jefferson’s 
Declaration of Independence, and Justice Clarence Thomas’s jurisprudence. Hugo 
Grotius explicitly grounded international law in natural law.19 But the specific notion 
that a treaty might be invalid for violation of a jus cogens norm did not enter positive 
law until the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, and it was not actually 
applied by international courts until decades later.20 
Moreover, the right of self-determination was not as well developed in 1923 as it is 
today. The Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations Covenant contain provisions 
calling for some form of self-determination for some peoples—usually European 
peoples. Article 22 of the Covenant in particular envisions that the Mandatory powers 
would help some peoples develop their own governing institutions. But after World 
War I the international community rejected President Wilson’s calls for a more robust 
treaty-based right of self-determination.21 During this period, self-determination was 
a “political principle, but not a right under international law,” and it was “subject 
to many limitations.”22 Certainly the British understood it as a principle rather 
than a right. In 1919, Balfour wrote to Lloyd George that “in the case of Palestine, 
we deliberately and rightly decline to accept the principle of self-determination,” 
since the present inhabitants would surely deliver an “anti-Jewish verdict,” but he 
felt Palestine was “absolutely exceptional” because the Jewish national home was of 
“world importance,” provided it could be obtained without either “dispossessing or 
oppressing the current inhabitants.”23 A “right” of self-determination did evolve as 
decolonization accelerated through the twentieth century, and self-determination was 
eventually enshrined in the 1945 UN Charter and subsequent instruments to protect 
human rights. But even today, the precise content of the right of self-determination 
remains uncertain. It does not, for example, include an absolute right to secede.
Even if some right of self-determination had emerged by 1923, it seems unlikely it 
had achieved the status of a jus cogens norm, which has to be “accepted and recognized 
by the international community of states as a whole.”24 Given the resistance to Wilson’s 
proposed right of self-determination, it is hard to conclude that the post–World War 
I community of states “as a whole” had agreed upon such a right. International law 
would not take on an anti-imperialist cast until after World War II.25
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But that is not to say the right of self-determination is irrelevant to interpretation 
of the Mandate or Balfour Declaration. In interpretation of treaties and other 
international instruments, the plain text is the first port of call.26 Lord Balfour may 
have believed his Declaration excluded a Palestinian right of self-determination, 
but the plain text of the Declaration endorses “civil and religious rights” for 
Palestinians—a phrase broad enough to embrace some form of self-determination. 
Nowhere does the Declaration disclaim Palestinian rights to self-determination.
True, the law of treaty interpretation also permits recourse to the context of 
the instrument. In particular, treaty law requires that one read an instrument in 
light of any “relevant rules of international law.”27 This rule again suggests that the 
Declaration’s proviso should be construed as protecting some form of Palestinian 
self-determination. Admittedly, in 1917 there was, at most, an emerging norm 
of self-determination. By 1923, however, the international community had 
begun to recognize such a norm; the Mandates themselves reflect a certain level 
of commitment to the principle of self-determination. In any case, if the Balfour 
Declaration is still in force today, it is a modern instrument that must be read in 
light of modern international law, which most certainly does include a jus cogens 
norm of self-determination. The most important human-rights treaty defining “civil 
rights,” the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, states the following 
in Article I: “All peoples have the right of self-determination.”28 If Britain wishes to 
avoid responsibility for ensuring “civil rights” for Palestinians, including this right of 
self-determination, it can renounce the Declaration and declare that it has no further 
legal effect. But Britain has not done so.
As a last resort, treaty law does permit recourse to the travaux préparatoires 
(“preparatory works,” or negotiating history) of an instrument, but only if the 
natural reading of the text is “ambiguous or obscure” or leads to an “absurd result.”29 
Opponents of Palestinian self-determination might argue that the term “civil rights” 
is ambiguous and thus that it should be interpreted by examining the drafting history 
of the Declaration (though not postpromulgation comments by Balfour and others). 
This argument would point to evidence that the men who drafted the Declaration 
and Mandate intended to exclude Palestinian rights of self-determination, even if 
they did not say so in the text. 
Commentators have long asserted that international law disfavors “negotiating 
history,” though that view has recently been challenged.30 (This controversy 
is analogous to the controversy over the use of “original intent” in American 
constitutional law.) A good case can be made for caution in the use of drafting 
history; identifying bureaucratic intent is challenging even when a bureaucracy is 
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unified. In the case of the Declaration, whose drafting process was chaotic, and the 
Mandate, it seems advisable to consult drafting history with caution. At any rate, the 
law says one should consult negotiating history only if the phrase “civil and religious 
rights” is “ambiguous,” “obscure,” or “absurd.”
The phrase “civil rights” certainly isn’t “obscure,” and interpreting it as including 
at least a weak form of self-determination—such as limited autonomy—hardly 
seems absurd. Is the phrase “civil rights” ambiguous? It might be vague, but it is not 
necessarily ambiguous. Vagueness refers to a term whose general meaning is agreed 
upon but whose outer boundaries are uncertain, such as the word “equality” or the 
color red. Ambiguity refers to a term that might have two starkly different meanings, 
like the word “light,” which can refer to illumination or weight. Vagueness is an 
inevitable part of all agreements, contracts and treaties alike; ambiguity should be 
avoided by any competent drafter. The Vienna Convention on the law of treaties 
does not support resort to drafting history for mere vagueness.
But even if one concludes that some resort to drafting history is appropriate, 
it is still not possible to read the term “civil rights” as entirely excluding some right 
of Arab self-determination. The drafting history of the Declaration and Mandate 
may or may not reflect consensus that there would be no Arab state or “national 
home,” but it certainly does not rule out lesser forms of Arab self-determination 
in Palestine, such as autonomy, local self-rule, or participation in a federal system. 
And the intention of the Allied powers as to the future of the Arabs in Palestine was 
far from clear in 1923. The British had already made conflicting promises to the 
Arabs and Jews, suggesting that the British government might have envisioned that 
“civil and religious rights” could amount to a “national home” for Arabs. At the very 
least, “civil and religious rights” would seem to mean much more than the rights 
Palestinian Arabs enjoyed throughout the term of the Mandate and thereafter.31
There is nothing radical about reading the term “civil rights” as including a right of 
self-determination. The right of self-determination does not necessarily mean a right 
to full statehood, secession, or even a “national home.” What is more, the right attaches 
only to “peoples,” not to small groups or individuals. In practice self-determination 
implies some right to participate in decisions about how a people will be governed. 
State practice, the foundation of customary international law, reflects a mixed attitude 
toward aspirations for national homes and statehood. While states acquiesced in many 
decolonization and independence movements in the twentieth century, they have 
also often opposed national liberation movements that seek independence, secession, 
statehood, or other robust forms of self-determination.32 
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In sum the Mandate for Palestine was a legally binding document, at least for as 
long as the Mandate existed. For that period of time, at least, it mooted the question of 
whether the Balfour Declaration standing alone was legally binding, since the Mandate 
restated and then enlarged upon the undertakings in the Balfour Declaration. The 
Mandate probably did not violate a jus cogens norm of self-determination, because 
the notion of jus cogens had not been accepted as positive law in 1923, and the right 
of self-determination was still emerging. But modern norms of self-determination 
should inform modern interpretation of the Declaration. Those norms imply that 
the Balfour Declaration, if still in force, might have legal implications for Britain’s 
current policy toward the Arab residents of Palestine. In particular Britain may have 
a continuing obligation to promote Arab self-determination in Palestine, though 
self-determination does not always take the form of full statehood.
The next section considers the legal status of the Balfour Declaration after the 
British terminated the Mandate in 1948.
The Balfour Declaration from 1948 to the Present
When the British announced that they were terminating the Mandate for Palestine, 
effective in 1948, did the Balfour Declaration disappear from the legal landscape? 
This section argues that it did not.
A threshold question is whether the British, acting pursuant to General Assembly 
Resolution 181(II), actually terminated the Mandate at all. Some jurists have suggested 
that the Mandate was not validly terminated, or was only partly terminated.33 The 
Mandate had the character of a multilateral treaty, as it reflected the decisions taken 
at San Remo and Sèvres, as well as the votes of the states in the League of Nations 
Council. Unless the treaty provides for one state to terminate it, one state cannot 
unilaterally end a multilateral treaty; all the parties have to consent.34 In this case the 
treaty terms are ambiguous about the process of termination: Article 28 of the Mandate 
does recognize the possibility of termination of the Mandate, but it does not make 
clear who could terminate it and how. Article 27 says modification requires consent of 
the League Council, the successor to which is the Security Council, not the General 
Assembly. 
Assembly Resolution 181(II) did reflect the views of a majority of the international 
community. That resolution was not unanimous, however; all the Arab states voted 
against it, and the United Kingdom, China, and eight other states abstained. Moreover, 
a General Assembly resolution ordinarily is not legally binding.35 The Resolution also 
seems to disregard the trusteeship process of the UN Charter. Article 77(1)(a) of the 
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Charter envisioned trusteeship agreements to place existing Mandates under the new 
Charter trusteeship system.36 For that matter, some modern jurists argue that the 
entire Mandate system was an invalid exercise in imperialism.37 On the other hand, 
state practice since 1948 suggests that many states have acquiesced in the termination 
of the Mandate: no state is clamoring for Britain to reassert its Mandatory authority. 
Moreover, Article 85 of the Charter empowered the General Assembly to oversee the 
new Trusteeship Council, suggesting that the Assembly possessed some competence 
to terminate the Mandate. 
Assuming the Mandate did terminate in 1948, its demise did not necessarily 
terminate the Balfour Declaration. The British government may have renounced 
the Mandate, but it did not renounce the Declaration itself. Since 1917 the law 
has gradually become more inclined to enforce unilateral declarations. At the time 
Lord Balfour issued his declaration, there was doubt about whether a unilateral 
statement made in good faith could be binding. But, as we saw earlier, the World 
Court held such declarations enforceable in Eastern Greenland (1933) and Nuclear 
Tests (1974). Insofar as the British government has renewed its commitment to the 
Declaration, it might be said to have issued new unilateral statements; even oral 
declarations (such as the one in Eastern Greenland) can be legally binding. Recently, 
the British government has said it is “proud” of the Declaration; it invited Israeli 
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to London to celebrate the one hundredth 
anniversary of the Declaration, and it has refused Palestinian demands that Britain 
apologize for the Declaration. One could interpret such statements as reaffirmations 
of the Balfour Declaration.
Reaffirmation is relevant not because of the main undertaking of the Declaration, 
which has been fulfilled by the creation of the State of Israel, but because of the 
proviso. The proviso is an unconditional promise: “it being clearly understood that 
nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing 
non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by 
Jews in any other country.” This language is absolute. It has none of the weasel words 
of the main clause (“view with favour,” “best endeavours,” and so forth). The proviso 
is the sort of promise that might constitute a legally-binding commitment under the 
Eastern Greenland/Nuclear Tests doctrine. Indeed, its unconditional nature makes it 
a better candidate for enforcement than the main undertaking in the Declaration.
Even if the Balfour Declaration has never had any binding force of its own, 
and even if the Mandate terminated validly, it is still possible that the civil rights 
proviso might have some residual legal effect today. When announcing its termination 
of the Mandate, Britain interpreted the Mandate as imposing three obligations: 
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(1) to promote the “well-being and development of the people of Palestine,” (2) to 
facilitate the Jewish “national home,” and (3) “to prepare the people of Palestine for 
self-government.”38 His Majesty’s Government gave itself high marks on the first two 
obligations, trumpeting the development of civic institutions, law and order, economic 
development, and growth of not only the Jewish but also the Arab population, and of 
course the establishment of the national home itself—all the while acknowledging that 
Britain was unable to prevent violence and civil strife. But the British government had 
to admit that it was “unable to make comparable progress towards the accomplishment 
of their third task, the preparation of the people for self-government, owing to the 
mutual hostility of Arabs and Jews.”39 That could be taken as an admission that Britain 
did not fulfill all its obligations under the Mandate—in particular, its obligation under 
Article 2: “safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, 
irrespective of race and religion.” Even if that statement is not an admission of failure 
to meet its obligations, the facts on the ground in 1948 suggest that Britain did less 
than a fulsome job of protecting Palestinian “civil rights.” 
By no means does this imply that Britain is legally responsible for all the ills of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. The law of state responsibility exempts Britain for force majeure 
and other acts not attributable to that state, such as the decision of Arab states to 
make war on the new state of Israel.40 International law holds Britain accountable 
only to an extent proportionate to Britain’s failure to abide by its own obligations, 
not the wrongdoing of others.41 Nor does the law of responsibility imply that Britain 
owes Palestinians enormous reparations. Rather, that body of law recognizes that 
when compensation is not adequate to redress a wrong, satisfaction is an appropriate 
remedy. Thus Article 37 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State 
Responsibility provides this: “Satisfaction may consist in an acknowledgement of the 
breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology or another appropriate modality.”42 
An apology or expression of regret would be a start, but “another appropriate 
modality” could also imply a foreign policy that aims to safeguard the “civil and 
religious rights” of “non-Jewish inhabitants in Palestine.” At a minimum this might 
entail promoting Palestinian voting and other civil rights, as well as access to holy 
places. Or it might mean a commitment to a stronger form of Palestinian governance 
than exists now, or confederation with another Arab state, or a demilitarized 
Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, or British recognition of a fully 
independent Palestinian state. Of course, Britain’s pursuit of any of these aims must 
be through peaceful means.43 A guiding principle for all of this is the norm of good 
faith that permeates modern international law.44
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Insofar as Britain may have reaffirmed the proviso to the Balfour Declaration, a 
broad interpretation of “civil and religious rights” would be consistent with modern 
human rights law. Today there is a stronger right of self-determination than was the 
case a century ago. Again, modern international law also obliges states to respect the 
sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity of the State of Israel, and in particular 
to oppose terrorism and other forms of violence.45 
Perhaps British and Palestinian diplomats might consider adjusting their talking 
points. The Palestinian Authority regularly denounces the Balfour Declaration as 
an unlawful violation of the right of self-determination. It has called for the British 
government to apologize for the Declaration and has threatened to sue Britain for 
damages ensuing from the Declaration.46 Palestinian anger about the Declaration is 
understandable. But it is not clear what court would have jurisdiction over a lawsuit, or 
what relief could be obtained.47 More important, the Palestinian Arabs might still have 
something to gain from the Balfour Declaration. They could insist that the proviso of 
the Declaration is valid and enforceable, and use it to press Britain to help ensure “civil 
and religious rights” for the Palestinian Arab people. Rhetorically, they could pivot 
from their traditional criticism of the Balfour Declaration to speak more favorably of 
the “Balfour Proviso,” the unconditional promise to protect Palestinian rights.
For its part, the British government has defended the Declaration but also 
admitted that the Declaration “should have called for the protection of political 
rights of the non-Jewish communities in Palestine, particularly their right to 
self-determination.”48 Britain is right that the Declaration should have protected 
the Palestinian right to self-determination explicitly, but Britain might do better 
to emphasize that the Declaration did call for the protection of “civil and religious 
rights” of non-Jewish communities in Palestine, and to interpret those rights as 
including a right to self-determination. Britain should take the opportunity of the 
one hundredth anniversary of the Balfour Proviso to redouble its efforts to facilitate 
a durable and just peace.
Conclusion
The Balfour Declaration may have continuing legal relevance—not as a promise 
of a Jewish national home, which has already been fulfilled, but as a promise for 
Palestinian rights. The Declaration’s proviso is part of the pre-existing legal framework 
upon which any future peace agreement will be constructed. Britain may have an 
ongoing legal obligation to ensure its promise is kept, or at least to make some form 
of diplomatic satisfaction to the Palestinian people in the form of an apology or 
“other modality.” 
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But even if Britain is free from any such residual legal obligation, it still has a 
moral obligation to help correct a state of affairs that it played a role in bringing 
about. Britain is not powerless to carry out this obligation. The British government 
has involved itself in attempts to construct a peace agreement, for example through 
its participation in the Middle East “Quartet” (the United Nations, the United 
States, Russia, and the European Union). Indeed, former British Prime Minister 
Tony Blair served as the Quartet’s chief diplomatic envoy from 2007 to 2015.
In current diplomatic practice, when drafting agreements or UN resolutions 
about the Arab-Israeli conflict, the authors begin by reciting a canonical list of 
sacred legal texts. At a minimum these lists usually include UN Security Council 
Resolutions 242 and 338, but sometimes they also mention the UN Charter, the 
Camp David Accords, the Oslo Accords, human rights treaties, or other planks 
in the legal framework. These “recitals” help lawyers draft and interpret the new 
instrument by providing a clearer sense of its context and purpose. Recitals also add 
an air of formality to a legal agreement, perhaps enhancing its “pull to compliance.”49
In the current climate, it is probably too much to hope that the drafters might add 
the Balfour Declaration to the canonical list of recitals. That is unfortunate because 
the Declaration has something to offer to both sides: security for the Israelis and 
an unfulfilled promise of “civil and religious rights” to the Palestinians. Eventually 
the two sides might see that it is in their interests to acknowledge the continuing 
relevance of the Declaration. In the meantime drafters should at least include recitals 
of human rights instruments that restate and enlarge upon the “civil and religious 
rights” first stated in the Balfour Proviso. Arab-Israeli peace agreements have not 
always done so.50 
Nonlawyers may be skeptical that pre-existing legal norms can influence the 
course of a negotiation. But good lawyers always survey the background law before 
they start drafting, and in treaty negotiations, the lawyers do the drafting. They draft 
in legal language, using a legal vocabulary and drawing on legal history. The Balfour 
Proviso establishes a human rights “floor” for future agreements: any such agreement 
must, at minimum, safeguard the “civil and religious rights” of the Palestinian Arabs. 
Of course later instruments—human rights treaties, UN resolutions—say roughly 
the same thing. But the Balfour Proviso was the first to say it in this specific context. 
It deserves a place at the table.
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